Motivation, resources, and the organization of the school system by Albornoz, Facundo et al.
Motivation, resources
and the organization of the school system∗
Facundo Albornoz (University of Nottingham and CONICET)†,
Samuel Berlinski (Inter-American Development Bank and IZA)‡,
Antonio Cabrales (University College London)§
July 2016
Abstract
This paper studies a model where student effort and talent interact with parental
and teachers’ investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich,
yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. It can show, for example, that an
improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school effort, which
are partially compensated through school resources. In this way, by incorporating the
behavioral responses of parents, teachers and policymakers, the paper provides a ra-
tionale for the existing ambiguous empirical evidence on the effect of school resources.
The paper also provides a novel microfoundation for peer effects, with empirical impli-
cations for welfare and different education policies.
JEL-Classification: I20, I21, I28, J24
Key-words: education, incentives, school resources, parental involvement, school sort-
ing, peer effects.
∗We thank Andre´s Erosa, Esther Hauk, Elena In˜arra, Gilat Levy, Diego Puga, Miguel Urquiola, and
seminar participants at University of Birmingham, Columbia University, LACEA, IMDEA, XIII Urrutia
Elejalde Summer School on Economics and Philosophy, Science Po, Seoul National University, Stockholm
School of Economics and Warwick. Albornoz is grateful for support from the ESRC (RES-062-23-1360),
Cabrales acknowledges the support the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under grant ECO2012-
34581.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Inter-American
Development Bank, its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent.
†facundo.albornoz@nottingham.ac.uk
‡samuelb@iadb.org
§a.cabrales@ucl.ac.uk
1
1 Introduction
Education policy is at the forefront of the social and political debate. The belief that edu-
cation is a catalyst for a better and more equitable society ensures its role in the political
agenda, in both developed and developing countries. As a consequence, a variety of policies
and reforms are continuously being proposed with the objective of improving the outcomes
of the education system. Surprisingly, the implementation and evaluation of these policies
often overlook the changes in behavior they can induce in the actors involved in the education
process. For example, the debate about the role of school resources on student learning does
not usually take into account behavioral responses from parents and school administrators.
Similarly, school vouchers proposals generally disregard their influence on parental involve-
ment in education. In this paper, we study a model of education where student learning
effort and outcomes, parental and school behavior, and public resources devoted to education
are endogenously determined in an integrated theoretical framework.
In our model, the determination of educational outcomes is a process involving four par-
ticipants: children, parents, headmasters/teachers, and the policymaker. Each child chooses
a certain level of effort devoted to learning. More able children obtain a higher learning
outcome from every unit of effort. Altruistic parents and schools affect the effort decision
through motivation schemes. However, inducing effort is costly for parents as well as for
teachers. There is an opportunity cost for the time involved in setting up and executing the
motivation plan, which may also include monitoring or helping children with their learning
tasks (such as homework). Schools resources (class size, for example), which are determined
by the policymaker, may affect the cost of motivating students in the same way as the talent
of parents and teachers. This integrated framework provides an accurate description of the
workings of the education process: parents, students and the education system interact in the
determination of school resources,mas education quality, school and parent involvement and,
through all these, on students outcomes. An advantage of our framework is its tractability,
which allows us to analyze many important dimensions of the education process.
We start by analyzing a model where children are homogeneous in terms of innate ability
and so are the parents’ characteristics, such as their talent and opportunity cost of time.
We find that the strength of parental and school involvement and the resources devoted to
education increase with the student’s innate ability. The results are less clear cut when we
analyze the impact of rising opportunity cost of time associated with parental involvement
in the learning process of their children. This introduces, in a natural way, the connection
between labor market conditions and the direct involvement of parents in the education of
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their children. This link goes beyond the hourly wage. For example, it can also capture
changes in opportunities and incentives for female participation in the labor market. In
either case, the strength of parental involvement is decreasing in the opportunity cost of
time.
The interaction between the school system and parental inputs is the reason why political
considerations are important. As their opportunity cost of time increases, parents would like
to rely more heavily on schools for motivating their children, which triggers actions by those
responsible for the education system. The policymaker anticipates participant choices and
satisfies parental wishes by increasing the resources devoted to education. Interestingly, the
increase in school resources may not be accompanied by an overall improvement in educa-
tional attainment. Our model can predict “disappointingly” weak effects of school resources
on student results even in situations where school resources do in fact affect learning cæteris
paribus . The weak effect can be rationalized because cæteris paribus does not hold when
resources increase. Parental involvement decreases because of a change in their opportu-
nity costs. School resources increase to offset this reduction.1 These additional resources
have in fact an effect, but this is not apparent because of concomitant changes in parental
involvement in the education process.
We then allow for children to differ in terms of ability and parental opportunity costs of
time, which leads to a number of insights. First, as the school determines their motivational
policy for the average individual in the classroom, school involvement is positively affected
by the mean ability of their students. In equilibrium, this affects the intensity of parental
involvement. Thus, peer effects arise endogenously, as the choice of effort and motivational
policy in equilibrium depend on the average ability of the student in the classroom. This
effect is reinforced by the determination of school resources. The policy maker decides
the level of resources optimally given the characteristics of the school attended by her/his
political reference child; in our case, the median voter’s child. Thus, the decision on school
resources will be based on the average ability within this school and on the median child’s
ability. As a consequence, student effort depends on the mean abilities of peers at her/his
school, plus the ability of the median child and of the peers of the median child. Our model
generates in this way a microfoundation for peer effects, rather than assuming they come
from some exogenous “contagion” process, as it is more common in the literature.
In this context, an increase in the opportunity cost of the median parent raises similar
1As an early example of the connection between parents’ opportunity costs and school resources, Flyer
and Rosen (1997) attribute the increase in school expenditures taking place in the United States during
1960-1990 to the growth in female labor-force participation.
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issues to those identified for the homogeneous case. However, the link between median
child characteristics and individual effort generates a channel through which changes in
the distribution of income (or talent) can affect the educational choices of households and
schools. For example, an increase in the income of the median child’s household will generate
an increase of resources in the system. This will induce a positive effect on households in
lower parts of the income distribution even if their incomes do not change. And the other
way around, if the income of the median does not change (or it changes very little) in an
environment where mean income is increasing markedly, there will be few changes in school
outcomes (or even a regression) at a time when income appears to be fast increasing.
Our work is also related to the literature that studies the endogenous determination of
class size. In Lazear (2001) class size is decided by schools according to student behavior.
For example, when students have a shorter attention span (i.e., they can be distracted more
easily) students should be sorted in smaller classrooms as they require closer attention. In
Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009), schools differ in productivity and offer different quality levels
(school size). As parents differ in earnings, sorting between schools with different class sizes
arises naturally. Our model offers a complementary mechanism behind the determination
of class size, which relies upon the interaction of parental and school motivation, which is
partly determined by the government through the (strategic) choice of school resources.
We organize the paper as follows: In section 2, we set up the model. We characterize
the equilibrium in section 3, where we discuss the interdependence between parental and
school motivation systems, school resources and student performance. Section 4 discusses
the connection of our results with the empirical literature. We conclude in section 5.
2 The model
Our model has four participants: children, parents, headmasters, and the policymaker.2
There are different ways to specify the production function of human capital. We assume
that learning requires innate talent and student effort. Parents and schools can affect this
process through different interventions and actions. In the core of the paper, we emphasize
parental and school interventions that affect student effort and therefore impact learning in
2With this structure we separate the actions of key participants in the education process, which allow
us to theoretically identify the sources of multiple interacting sources of student effort. Teachers play a
passive role and their preferences are subsumed under the headmaster actions, who, as explained in detail
below, acts as an average teacher within each school. This simplification suppresses interesting potential
principal-agent problems within schools. We do this to be able to focus better on the interactions between
schools, families and the public sector.
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an indirect way.
Assuming that parents and schools can affect learning effort is consistent with what psy-
chologists call “Achievement Goal Theory” (see, for example, Covington (2000)). According
to this perspective, achievement goals influence the quality, timing and appropriateness of
the students’ engagement in their own learning (e.g., analyzing the demands of school tasks,
planning and allocating resources to meet these demands, etc.). This effort together with
innate ability affect the student’s accomplishments. In our model, parents and teachers play
a key role in influencing the student’s achievement goals and, in turn, their effort.
Two kinds of goals have been predominantly studied in achievement goal theory: learning
goals and performance goals. Learning goals refer to increasing one’s competency, under-
standing and appreciation of what is learned. Performance goals involve outperforming
others in tests or other achievement measures. In our model, parents and teachers can be
thought as focusing on affecting learning goals.
Crucially, inducing effort is costly for parents as well as for schools. Both for parents and
teachers, the main cost is the opportunity cost of the time involved encouraging students in
the pursuit of learning goals. The cost for schools depends as well on the level of resources
(for example, class size), which are determined by a policymaker.3
Student performance and children’s short-term utility Human capital for child
i, Hi, (measured in monetary terms) is a linear function of her effort, ei, and a productivity
parameter, υi. In particular, we assume,
Hi = υiei. (1)
In the core of the paper, we assume υi to be exogenous, which can therefore be interpreted
as a measure of innate talent. We discuss the implications of different specifications of Hi in
Appendices A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Children internalize only imperfectly the effect of their effort on human capital. The
role of parents and teachers is to induce students to exert costly effort through different
motivational tools. In particular, we postulate that children’s short-term utility is given by:
3We think there are good reasons to separate the actions of the policymaker and the teachers. To begin
with, the model approximates more closely what we think is the actual decision process in reality. Perhaps
more importantly, the current modeling choice helps to distinguish the channels through which the different
parameters produce effects on, for example, teacher involvement and school resources. And since those
variables are in principle observable and distinguishable, the separation of actions thus helps one of the
objectives of the paper: to provide guidance for empirical research.
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USi = c1iei + c2jei −
1
2
e2i . (2)
Exerting effort implies a cost that takes a quadratic form. Parent and teacher’s involve-
ment enters positively in the utility of the child, c1iei + c2jei, with the sub-index j denoting
the school attended by child i. c1i (c2j) is a summary of the strength of parental (teacher)
incentives for every unit of child’s effort. Therefore, c1iei + c2jei is the child’s total reward
for her effort.4,5
We are agnostic about the exact real life counterpart of c1i (c2j). We think about it as
a reduced form of a complex incentive structure that arises within families (schools). For
example, c1i include rewards such taking a child to the park, shopping or any leisure activity,
but c1i may also capture forms of motivation that require direct parental involvement in the
learning process (e.g., helping with homework, going to museums, science fairs, or cultural
activities) and that affect the value of acquiring knowledge.6 In other words, the role of
parents (teachers) is to help children internalize the value of ei (and ultimately Hi) in their
utility function.
Pomerantz, Moorman, and Litwack (2007) argue that parental involvement7 in school can
enhance children’s school performance through either skill development (e.g., by instruct-
ing children) or motivational development (e.g., by providing intrinsic reasons for learning).
Some motivational activities clearly play both roles. Take for example, helping with home-
work. On the one hand, it increases the productivity of the children effort (i.e., is tantamount
to an increase in υi). On the other hand, it increases the intrinsic value of studying for the
4This linear structure of rewards is analogous to the linear contracts that are widespread in reality.
Bose, Pal, and Sappington (2011) justify the use of linear contracts by showing that, in a broad class of
environments, the optimal linear contract always secures for the principal at least 90% of the expected profit
secured under a fully optimal contract. Furthermore, Carroll (2013) considers an environment in which the
principal is uncertain about what the agent can and cannot do and wants to write a contract that is robust
to this uncertainty. He finds that, under very general circumstances, the optimal contract is linear.
5As we focus on effective motivation schemes, their costs both for parents and schools depend on student
effort. This naturally introduces interactions between parents and schools. Framing these modeling choices
in the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, notice that assuming that the cost of c1 is
increasing in student effort is natural when considering c1 as extrinsic motivation (e.g. helping with homework
or rewarding activities). Our modeling choice for c1 is potentially more restrictive in the case of intrinsic
motivation. If increasing the intrinsic learning satisfaction of children making more effort requires spending
more time with them (e.g. more hours reading books or carrying out cultural or scientific activities) then
our assumption would also work well in the case of intrinsic motivation.
6Notice that we implicitly assume commitment problems away. If c1 is interpreted as a reward, parents
may in principle renege on their promises. To avoid this problem, it is possible to interpret the relationship
between parents and children as a repeated game where reputation resolves the commitment issues.
7Following Hoover-Dempsey and Sandler (1997), parental involvement includes home-based activities
related to children’s learning (e.g., helping with homework, discussing school events) and school-based in-
volvement (e.g., volunteering at school, attending school functions).
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child because parental involvement and concerns help children internalize the benefits of
their effort. We focus on the motivational channel and leave for the appendix the discussion
of parental interventions that directly affects the productivity of learning effort (Appendix
A.1).
The additive specification for parent and teacher incentives implies that parents and
school involvement are substitutes.8 Changing this assumption would yield no qualitative
differences, as we discuss below and in Appendix A.3.
Of course, effort may also be obtained through negative reinforcement (punishment). In
this case, we could have written the utility in the alternative way:
USi = − (c1i + c2j) (1− ei)−
1
2
e2i = (c1i + c2j) ei − (c1i + c2j)−
1
2
e2i .
As will be clear below, this utility induces the same optimal action ei from her as the
one we examine. Thus, provided the costs of the two incentive systems can be written in the
same way, there will be no difference in any equilibrium value.9
The parents’ utility We assume that every parent has one child and that their utility
is influenced by the sum of her performance and their own welfare, denoted by Wi (also
measured in monetary terms, as Hi).
10 Hence,
UPi = Hi +Wi.
Parental welfare depends on the time spent at work or pursuing leisure activities. This
is the total time (T ) available minus the time spent with the child as a consequence of the
reward scheme (ti). The effective reward (c1iei) depends on time (ti) and parental efficiency
(υPi) to generate a given effective reward, so that c1iei = 2tiυPi . The parameter υPi captures
the fact that some parents are better at motivating than others and consequently they
generate a larger reward for any given amount of time devoted to their children. That is,
we associate productivity of parental involvement with some innate attribute, such as talent
8This formulation also assumes that effort is perfectly correlated with human capital. Nothing major
would change in the model if the relationship between effort and output were noisy, provided effort were
observable and contractible. We do not think this is an unrealistic assumption in the case of children. Non-
observability of effort with noisy output would be, of course, more complicated but we do not think any new
insights would be gained by studying that case.
9In our setting, this is the case because we assume that parents care about H but not about her short
term utility.
10The utility function below does not internalize the child’s cost of effort, so it is not purely “sympathetic”.
We have also done the computations with strictly sympathetic parents’ utility and there are no significant
changes.
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or persuasiveness. Implicitly, we are imposing that the time devoted inducing effort, for a
given effective reward, is decreasing in the ability of the parent to generate it. In Appendix
A.4, we study the effect of parental attention, where υPi is derived endogenously and shown
to depend on the opportunity cost of time.
Thus, letting ψi be the opportunity cost of parent i yields,
Wi = (T − ti)ψi =
(
T − c1iei
2υPi
)
ψi,
and, therefore,
UPi = υiei +
(
T − c1iei
2υPi
)
ψi. (3)
Since ψi is an opportunity cost of time for parents, it can be interpreted as a wage rate,
although it can also be the value of leisure or something else.11 Hence, in the remainder of
the paper we often refer to this parameter as parental income.12
Remark 1 Parents also value (negatively) the (lump-sum) taxes that the government will
need to levy in order to pay for school resources.13 We do not include them here explicitly in
order to avoid an excess of notation. Given the quasi-linearity in income of utility and that
taxation is already decided by the time parents choose their effort, the amount of those taxes
do not affect the parental effort decision.
The school objective function According to Covington (2000), every classroom re-
flects rules that determine the basis on which students will be evaluated and how rewards
will be distributed. We assume that teachers reward students based on individual learning
expectations and not in a competition for one or a few prizes. The school rewards (and
therefore the learning goals) are determined by the teachers’ effort.14
11In our context, the marginal utility of money earned by parents is linear. Hence, the value of time for
parents with high wages is larger. Things may be different with concave utility for money. In that case, low
wage earners may have a higher opportunity cost of time. We are agnostic about which parents have the
higher opportunity cost of time in reality.
12Notice we are not considering parental teaching time in this specification of parents’ welfare. How-
ever, this would be easily incorporated into the analysis by assuming Hi = Ti + Wi, and Wi =(
T − c1iei2υPi −
1
2
T 2i
υPi
)
ψi where t
′
i = T
2
i /2υPi represents the actual units of time a parent devotes to teach-
ing and Ti represents effective teaching time. Notice as well that this component is independent of student
effort and has no interaction with c1i and therefore it will have no effect on our results.
13Introducing proportional taxation would not be difficult. Proportional taxes would entail a reduction in
the parental opportunity cost of effort ψi and thus we can understand the impact of this kind of taxation by
examining the effects of changes in ψi.
14For simplicity we assume that the costs of creating the rewards for the teachers are unrelated to student
ability.
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We assume that the headmaster of a public school chooses the intensity of motivation
(summarized in the parameter c2j) and therefore, teachers’ effort, in order to maximize the
sum of the average student performance and the welfare of the average teacher in the school.
Of course, headmasters may be driven by other goals or use other statistics to measure school
performance. In Appendices A.5 and A.6, we change the goal of maximizing average student
performance in two crucial ways. In Appendix A.5, we study a case in which the headmaster
cares more about a group of students according to their place in the distribution of human
capital.15. We also study the case where headmasters are imposed an exogenous standards
(Appendix A.6), such as, for example, that the average score be higher than a particular
threshold (reference point). We show that the main messages of our analysis are robust to
these variations in the headmaster’s goals.
The average welfare of a teacher is determined by the difference between the total time
available to him and the average time he devotes to his students, which we assume is a linear
function of c2jei, and inversely related to υTj , the motivational ability of a representative
teacher at school j. Thus, letting γ be the opportunity cost of teachers’ time,16
UHMj =
1
Nj
∑
i∈j
υiei +
(
T − nj
Nj
∑
i∈j
c2jei
2υTj
)
γ, (4)
where Nj is the total number of students in school j and nj is the number of students
per classroom. Notice that Nj in the denominator makes clear that students are randomly
allocated to classes and nj in the numerator captures that larger classrooms involve more
time for teachers.17
15More specifically, we study an alternative formulation where the headmaster cares about a weighted
average of the mean and any order statistic of the distribution of human capital within the school. See
Aucejo (2011) for an example of how teachers adjust their population targets within a classroom to changes
in the goals imposed by the authorities.
16We assume that the opportunity cost of the teacher γ is unrelated to her talent υTj . This is done to
simplify notation. Little is changed if γ depends on υTj . It is worth pointing out that this is not the teacher’s
wage but rather the value of his alternative use of time which can either be leisure or the compensation he
will get from, say, private tutoring. Notice as well that, as in the case of parents, we assume that the time
devoted to motivate students depend linearly on their effort (e.g. highly motivated students require more
challenging material or activities, which involve more time for their teachers).
17This specification implicitly assumes that teachers spend the same amount of time with students within a
class. We think that this is reasonable, as a teacher that spent in a consistent way significantly larger amounts
of time with some students than with others is likely to be challenged by parents, except for very especial
children (say because they have an obvious disability). Even in countries with a history of discrimination,
unequal treatment within a classroom occurs only under special circumstances (see e.g. Jain and Narayan
(2011)).
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The policymaker objective function The policymaker maximizes the utility of the
(median-voter) parent (denoted by P¯i) which, as discussed in remark 1, requires adding the
cost of school resources (1/n). The decision about resources is taken and announced before
parents and headmasters simultaneously decide their actions (c1i and c2j). Therefore, the
cost of resources does not appear in UPi or UHMj because parents and headmasters take them
as given when making decisions about their involvement. These costs are paid by parents
through general taxation, which parents care about, and are internalized by the policymaker
when deciding n.
The cost depends on the number of classes to be manned. That is, the ratio of total
number of students in the system, N , to the number of students per class, n. For simplicity,
we assume that schools operate at full capacity and with the same class size so that nj = n
for all j. Manning costs are assumed to be quadratic in the number of classrooms N/n.
This can be justified by taking into consideration that the state has monopsony power in
the market for teachers and faces a marginal cost function that increases in the number of
teachers hired. This is so, for example, because to attract one more teacher the monopsonist
has to pay an extra cost, since the marginal potential teacher needs a higher reward to be
attracted to the profession.
Thus, we can represent the policymaker’s preferences as,
UPM = UP¯i −
1
N
ω′
2
(
N
n
)2
, (5)
where ω′ is a constant parameter summarizing the cost of the chosen class size and 1
N
ω′
2
(
N
n
)2
is the per capita cost of that class size.18 Our formulation assumes that schools are financed
out of lump sum taxation and the government keeps a balanced budget. For ease of notation,
in the remainder we denote ω = ω′N, so that
UPM = UP¯i −
ω
2
1
n2
, (6)
The structure of the game Summarizing, the policymaker announces first the policy
variable (n). After this announcement, parents and headmasters simultaneously decide their
optimal levels of rewards per unit of effort c1i and c2j, respectively. After observing parents’
and schools’ announcements, the children decide their optimal level of effort, ei.
18Alternatively, the formulation can be reinterpreted by assuming that the average quality of teachers
when hiring k people is 1/
√
k. Hence, in order to man N/n classrooms and keep the quality of teaching per
classroom constant,(N/n)
2
teachers need to be hired. If ω′/2 is the wage per employed person the total cost
of N/n classrooms is ω
′
2
(
N
n
)2
and the cost per student 1N
ω′
2
(
N
n
)2
.
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3 Equilibrium
We solve the game by backward induction.
3.1 Students’, parents’, and school choices
From equation (2), it follows that the optimal student action is
ei = c1i + c2j. (7)
Substituting this expression into the parents’ utility, equation (3), we obtain
UPi = (c1i + c2j) υi +
(
T − 1
2υPi
c1i (c1i + c2j)
)
ψi.
The first-order conditions for the parents’s problem is then
υi −
(
c1i +
c2j
2
) ψi
υPi
= 0.
Given that UPi is concave in c1i, the optimal choice of the parent is
c1i = max
{
υPiυi
ψi
− c2j
2
, 0
}
, (8)
which by definition is non-negative since motivation is conducted in units of time.
It is clear from the expression for c1i that the strength of parental involvement is in-
creasing in the abilities of the child (υi) and the parent (υPi), and decreasing in the parental
opportunity cost of time (ψi). Notice that υPi and ψi capture different aspects of the parental
capability in motivating students. To simplify the parameter space, let us define the relative
efficiency of parental motivation as
ΥPi ≡
υPi
ψi
,
which is a sufficient statistic to describe relative efficiency of parents in extracting one unit
of effort from their children. It follows that parental involvement increases in ΥPi . Finally,
equation (8) shows the negative relationship between c1i and c2j. When motivation in the
school is high, the gains from additional effort induced by parental motivation are smaller.
We shall discuss below how both incentive schemes may compensate each other in responding
to changes in ψi, υPi and υi.
At this point, the following clarification is in order:
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Remark 2 The assumption of substitute rewards is not essential for the negative rela-
tionship between c1i and c2j. A similar result is obtained with other specifications where
parental and school efforts are complements. For example, when Hi = υiei
α, with α < 1 and
USi = c1ic2jei − 12e2i rather than USi = c1iei + c2jei − 12e2i . (see Appendix A.3).
The driving force of our result is that the marginal cost of motivational efforts are in-
creasing in student effort. If higher motivation at the school induces higher learning effort,
then it is harder for parents to increase student effort of already school-motivated children.
The same logic applies at the school level when parental motivation increases and induces
greater student effort. Thus, the substitutability of motivation at school and at home emerges
naturally from our modeling choice of motivation costs.
By substituting the optimal choice of children’s effort into the utility function of the
headmaster (4) we obtain:
UHMj =
1
Nj
∑
i∈j
(c1i + c2j) υi +
(
T − nj
Nj
∑
i∈j
c2j (c1i + c2j)
2υTj
)
γ.
It follows that an interior solution for the headmaster’s optimization problem implies
c2j =
υTjυj
γnj
− c1j
2
, (9)
where υj is the mean student ability and c1j is the mean parental reward for the students
attending school j.
As in the case of the parents, we define the relative efficiency of teachers’ motivation as
ΥTj ≡
υTj
γ
.
We can interpret ΥTjυj as the school quality. Clearly, the talent of teachers plays a key
role in defining schools’ quality. Also, as in Epple and Romano (1998), the quality of schools
depends on the average of the peers’ talent. A higher average peer talent is associated
with greater classroom motivation. This association, which will tend to amplify school
differences in student performance, will be important in the emergence of peer effects. Also,
raising opportunity costs for teachers and larger class sizes lead to lower levels of classroom
motivation. It is, of course, through this latter channel that public resources affect student
performance. Finally, a high level of parental involvement is associated with lower school
incentives.
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3.2 Equilibrium in the homogeneous case
In order to solve for the first stage of the game, let us first assume that children, parents
and teachers are all identical, so that υi = υ, υPi = υP and ψi = ψ for all i ∈ {1, .., N} and
υTj = υT for all j. In this case we have that c1i = c1 for all i and and c2j = c2 for all j.
Therefore, from (8), (9) and the definitions of ΥPi and ΥTj , an interior solution for c1 and
c2implies
c1 = ΥPυ − c2
2
(10)
and
c2 =
ΥTυ
n
− c1
2
. (11)
In the first stage, the policymaker considers the optimal level of school and parental
involvement. After substituting (11) in (10) and plugging the resulting expression, together
with (7), into (6) we obtain
UPM =
2υ2
3
(
ΥP +
ΥT
n
)
+
(
Tψ − 2υ
2
9
(
2ΥP +
ΥT
n
− Υ
2
T
n2ΥP
))
− ω
2
1
n2
As we show for the general heterogeneous case in the next section, preferences are uni-
modal in the policy parameter n and we can apply the median-voter theorem to obtain the
optimal level of n. The interior solution that results from maximizing the above expression
with respect to n is (assuming ω > 4υ2Υ2T/(9ΥP ))
n =
ω − 4υ2
9ΥP
Υ2T
4υ2
9
ΥT
. (12)
By inspection of (12) we immediately have:
Proposition 1 (comparative statics of class size) Class size is:
• increasing in the cost of manning classes (ω) and relative efficiency of parental moti-
vation (ΥP ).
• decreasing in student ability (υ) and relative efficiency of teachers’ motivation (ΥT ).
The effect of ω is economically obvious. The influence of teachers on schools resources is
subtle. Remember that ΥT increases in υT (teacher talent) and decreases in γ (opportunity
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cost of teachers’ time). The effect of γ connects the commitment of teachers to government
investment in school resources. If teachers find it harder to devote their time to school
activities, the benefits of reducing the class size are marginally lower. On the other hand,
teacher talent (υT ) reinforces the benefits of investing in smaller classes. To our knowledge,
these are empirically unexplored contrasting channels through which teacher characteristics
influence public investment in school resources. Notice that the effect is even more complex
if we allowed a positive correlation between teaching talent and the opportunity cost of
teaching.
We also find that resources increase in student ability. This is a natural consequence of the
fact that in our model, the marginal benefits for both parents and schools of strengthening
teaching incentives increase with student talent.
Finally, the time parents can devote to their children’s learning process has a direct (and
observable) effect on school resources. Remember that ΥP increases in υP (parental talent)
and decreases in ψ (opportunity cost of parents’ time). For example, the post-war decades
were characterized by a large increase in female labor-force participation. Arguably, this
is compatible with an increase in ψ. This would result in our model in an decrease of n
(probably moderated by a concomitant increase in γ). Indeed, Flyer and Rosen (1997) find
a connection between the rapid growth in public expenditures associated with elementary
and secondary education in the US and the rising value of women’s time.19
We substitute the optimal level of n in equation (11) and then into equations (7) and
(10) to obtain the equilibrium values of c1, c2 and e. These are:
c1 =
2ΥPυ
3
(
2ω − 3 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
, (13)
c2 =
2ΥPυ
3
(
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
− ω
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
, (14)
which imply:
19Between 1960 and 1990 the real costs of elementary and secondary education increased by 300 percent.
The main cause of the increase in expenditures per student was rising school staff, with a halving of the
number of the student-teacher ratios between 1950 and 1990. The paper studies further the connection
between female labor force participation and student-teacher ratios using a panel of 50 US states during 4
decades. They found that increases in female labor force participation rates explain a significant part of both
the level and growth in states’ student-teacher ratios. Moreover, the findings are robust to other plausible
explanations such as increases in unionization and changes in fertility patterns.
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e =
2ΥP υ
3
ω
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
. (15)
From inspecting the above expressions, it becomes clear that obtaining positive values of
c1, c2 imposes the following parameter restriction:
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
> ω >
3
2
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
. (16)
Notice that the right-hand side of this condition also ensure positive values for n and e.
The following proposition gives a complete characterization of the main comparative statics:
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics of motivation and student effort)
1. The strength of parental motivation (c1):
• increases in υ, ω and in ΥP
• is decreasing with respect to ΥT
2. The strength of school motivation (c2):
• increases in ΥT and υ
• is decreasing with respect to ω and ΥP
3. Student effort (e):
• increases in ΥT and υ.
• decreases in ω.
• is ambiguous with respect to ΥP .
Proof See Appendix C
The resulting comparative statics with respect to ΥT are simple to understand. An in-
crease in teacher ability induces higher school involvement, which in turn induces higher
student effort and reduces the strength of parental motivation. The effects of student in-
nate ability, υ, appears obvious from inspecting (14) and (15). However, this expression
masks subtle behavioral feedbacks taking place between parents and schools. Using the
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parameter restrictions, we obtain that the sign of ∂c1
∂υ
is negative. This means that talent re-
duces parental motivational efforts in equilibrium. But a lower c1 induces higher motivation
provision at the school (c2), which more than compensates lower levels of c1.
The effect on effort (e) of a decrease in ΥP (resulting for example, from an increase
in parental opportunity cost ψ) is ambiguous. First, a lower ΥP translates into higher
opportunity cost for parents to engage in motivational activities. Hence, c1 decreases with
the lower ΥP . The school system reacts to this by reducing n and increasing c2. The driving
force for this result is that the policymaker devotes more resources to classroom education,
which lowers the cost of inducing effort by the school. Conversely, lower class size and the
consequent stronger school ethos, reduces the gain from inducing children’s effort at home.
The optimal effort decision is equal to the sum of parental and school involvement. When
the opportunity cost for parents increases, the resulting fall in parental involvement is not
always fully compensated by the school system. Therefore, the net effect of a decrease in
ΥP on student performance may be negative. To see this:
∂e
∂ΥP
=
2
3
υωΥP (9ωΥP − 8υ2Υ2T )(
3ωΥP − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2)2
which implies that effort decreases with a lower ΥP when
ω <
8υ2Υ2T
9ΥP
= 2
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
.
.
Notice that from (16)
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
> ω >
3
2
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
so that effort and school performance can be both increasing or decreasing within our para-
metric range.
3.3 Equilibrium in the heterogeneous case
We relax now the assumption of identical children. For expositional clarity, we define the
following parameter:
Ωj ≡ 1
Nj
∑
i∈j
ΥPiυi.
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In words, Ωj is the average at the school level of student ability times the ratio between
parental motivational ability and their opportunity cost of time. Thus, each school j is
associated with a particular Ωj.
To obtain the utility of the policymaker, we substitute (9) in (8) and plug the resulting
expression into (7). This yields
e∗i = ΥPiυi +
1
3
(
2
n
ΥTjυj − Ωj
)
, (17)
where υj is the average student ability in school j. Thus, equation (6) becomes:
UPM =
(
ΥPiM υiM +
1
3
(
2
n
ΥTjM υjM − ΩjM
))
υiM +
+
(
TψiM −
1
2ΥPiM
((
ΥPiM υiM
)2
− 1
9
(
2
n
ΥTjM υjM − ΩjM
)2))
− ω
2n2
,
where M stands for the median voter and, therefore, υjM and ΩjM are average characteristics
in the school the median voter attends.
The following lemma states that preferences are unimodal in the policy parameter, n,
and proves the validity of the median-voter theorem to determine school resources (n) in our
framework.
Lemma 1 Preferences of parents with respect to n are unimodal for all parents if 1
Nj
∑
i∈j ΥPiυi <
3 mini∈{1,...,N}ΥPiυi.
Proof Please see Appendix B.
In words, the preferences of parents are unimodal if the minimum value of ΥPiυi (the
relative efficiency of parental motivation times the child’s talent) is not lower than a third
of the average value of ΥPiυi in the population.
The first-order condition for the policymaker’s maximization problem, provided an inte-
rior solution exists, is:
∂UPM
∂n
= −2
3
υiMΥTjM υjM
n2
− 2
9
ΥTjM υjM
ΥPiM n
2
(
2
n
ΥTjM υjM − ΩjM
)
+
ω
n3
= 0. (18)
We can make the following assumption to reduce notational complexity:
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Assumption 1
ΥPiM υiM = ΩjM .
This means that the product of parental and individual parameters for the median child
is equal to the average ratio in her school. Using this assumption, equation (18) simplifies
to:
∂UPM
∂n
= −2
3
υiMΥTjM υjM
n2
+
2
9
ΥTjM υjMυiM
n2
−
(
2ΥTjM υjM
3
)2
1
ΥPiM n
3
+
ω
n3
= 0
and thus we obtain:
n =
ω −
(
2ΥTjM
υjM
3
)2
1
ΥPiM
4
9
υiMΥTjM υjM
. (19)
A positive class size requires ω −
(
2ΥTjM
υjM
3
)2
1
ΥPiM
> 0.
Proposition 3 (Comparative statics of class size in heterogeneous schools) Class
size is:
• increasing in the opportunity cost of manning classes (ω) and the relative efficiency of
the median voter’s parent (ΥPiM ).
• decreasing in the ability of the median student (υiM ), the average talent of her/his peers
(υjM ) ; and the relative efficiency of teachers at the median voter’s school (ΥTjM ).
Proof Immediate from equation 19.
Similarly to the homogeneous case (Proposition 1), class size increases with the cost of
manning classes. Moreover, school resources are the result of political considerations and
the characteristics of the median parents, his child and the school she attends are critical in
the determination of class size as well.20 In particular, class size in public schools decreases
when the opportunity cost of the median parent or his child’s ability increases. Finally, class
size is also decreasing in the quality of peers and teachers in the school the median child
attends.
20This is because our modeling choice targets the median voter, as we show in Appendix A.5., this result
could vary if the political process was different.
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From the derivation of (19) it is clear that parents of children with υi above υiM would
like the level of school resources to be higher (e.g., smaller class sizes). So it would make
sense for them to supply the school with extra resources, in the form of their own time and
material resources. This has strong implications for segregation as it provides a reason for
parents to look into private school provision. But even within public schools, they can choose
to do so, if they are allowed. This could explain why parents choose to organize activities
in schools, which can have a sizable effect on student achievement, as Anghel and Cabrales
(2010) document for the case of Spain.
Using equation (19), the equilibrium values for c1i, c2j and ei follow:
c1i = ΥPiυi −
2
3
(
ΥTjυj
n
− Ωj
2
)
(20)
c2j =
4
3
(
ΥTjυj
n
− Ωj
2
)
(21)
ei = ΥPiυi +
2
3
(
ΥTjυj
n
− Ωj
2
)
(22)
The comparative statics with respect to individual characteristics are as follows:
Proposition 4 (Comparative statics on individual characteristics)
1. Parental motivation (c1i) increases in υi and ΥPi and is decreasing with respect to ΥTj
2. School motivation (c2j) increases in ΥTj .
3. Student effort (ei) increases in υi, ΥTj and ΥPi,
Proof Immediate from inspection of equations (20), (21) and (22)
These results are similar to those established for the homogeneous case (Proposition 2)
with one exception, the contribution of parent ability ΥPi . In Proposition 4 student effort
(ei) increases in ΥPi , whereas Proposition 2 stated that student effort (e) was ambiguous
with respect to ΥP . In both cases, parents have a direct impact on their children through
their motivation efforts at home. The homogeneous case introduces an additional channel as
all the parents are the median parent. Thus, they trigger a counterbalancing effect through
inducing more school resources. In the heterogeneous, this is only true for the median parent.
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The model provides a micro-foundation for the emergence of peer effects in the classroom
without technological assumptions.21 The expression for (22) reveals that, in equilibrium,
the performance of student i is affected by the ability of her peers through different channels.
First, υj enters directly in Equation (22) increasing student effort. However, it also enters
negatively through Ωj. This captures the substitutability between parental and school mo-
tivation. To clarify the net effect of peers, let us denote the correlation coefficient between
ΥPi and υi as rPiυi . We also denote the standard deviation of ΥPi and υi as sPi and sυi
respectively. Since,
rPiυi =
Ωj − υjΥPj
sPisυi
,
we obtain:
ei = υiΥPi +
2
3
(
υjΥTj
n
− rPiυisPisυi + υjΥPj
2
)
.
Now we can establish:
Proposition 5 (Peer effects) Assume that rPiυi ≥ 0, and that both the correlation rPiυi
as well as standard deviations sPi and sυi are invariant to υj. Then, student effort increases
in the ability of her own peers (υj);
Proof Since rPiυi , sPi and sυi are invariant to υj
∂ei
∂υj
=
2
3
(
ΥTj
n
− 1
2
ΥPj
)
Note also that c2j ≥ 0 requires that ΥTjυjn − Ωj2 =
ΥTjυj
n
− rPiυisPisυi+υjΥPj
2
=
ΥTjυj
n
− 1
2
υjΥPj −
rPiυisPisυi
2
≥ 0. But, then, given that rPiυi ≥ 0(
ΥTj
n
− 1
2
ΥPj
)
υj ≥
ΥTjυj
n
− 1
2
υjΥPj −
rPiυisPisυi
2
≥ 0
and the result follows.
Our model predicts that children who attend a school or class with better peers would
improve their effort and educational outcomes. The following are the mechanisms operating
21We show in Appendix A.2 that introducing standard exogenous peer effects, where the human capital of
the child is multiplied by a parameter capturing how performance is directly affected by the effort of peers,
only amplifies the effects established in Proposition 5.
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in this situation. First, higher quality students increase school effort. However, parents
do react to the increase in school efforts in the expected direction. Parents of children in
schools with better (worse) peers reduce (increase) their involvement. Under the parametric
assumptions of our model the parental reactions are not strong enough to offset the higher
school effort.22 Thus, our model predicts a positive effect for a child that enters a higher
quality school but this will be attenuated by parental behavioral responses.
Performance is also affected by the ability of the median student, the characteristics of
her peers (ability and parental involvement) and her teacher’s ability. We collect these effects
on individual student effort coming from the political process in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 (Political effects on student effort) The student effort increases in the
ability of the median student (υiM ); the ability of her/his teachers (ΥTjM ); her/his peers (υjM )
and her/his parent (ΥPiM ).
Proof From equation 22 we know that ei is decreasing in n.The results then follows
directly from proposition 3.
As in the case of homogeneous parents and children, an economy-wide increase in parental
opportunity costs induces a reduction of involvement by the parent (the effect of a decrease
of ΥPi on c1j is negative) which is partially compensated by the increased involvement of the
school system (the effect of a decrease in ΥPiM on c2j is positive). But because of the link
between the median child and individual effort, changes in the distribution of income (or
talent) can affect outcomes as well. For example, a decrease in ΥPiM will generate (for fixed
θj) an increase of resources (a decrease in n) which will have a positive effect on lower-income
households even if their incomes do not change. Thus, a rising tide lifts all boats in this
case.23 And the other way around, if ΥPiM is unchanged (or almost, again for fixed θj) in an
environment where mean income is increasing markedly, there will be few changes in school
outcomes (or even a regressive response, because of the negative reaction in c1i of very high
income households) at a time when GDP is increasing.
Equation (22) underlines an important issue regarding the generalization of partial equi-
librium studies of stratification to the entire education system. In general, reduced form
work (e.g., Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011)) will focus on isolating the direct effect of υj
22This is straightforward to check by looking at the derivatives of c1i and c2j with respect to υj in equations
20 and 21.
23Corcoran and Evans (2010) find that 12 to 22 percent of the increase in local school spending in the U.S.
over the period 1970-2000 is attributable to rising inequality.
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on Hi. However, a generalized system for tracking students affects both υj and υjM . Thus,
the general equilibrium implications may differ from the partial equilibrium ones through
the political determination of the resources in the school system.
4 Connections with the empirical literature
Our results speak to two strands of the empirical literature that measure the causal effects
of educational policy on student outcomes. First, to those who study the impact of changing
school resources (e.g., reducing class-size). Second, to those who look at the effect of placing
children in better schools. Here the word “better” is associated with some or all of the
following characteristics: higher socio-economic status or ability peers, more skilled teachers,
smaller class-sizes and better school facilities.
Isolating the effect of class size, or any other input, on educational outcomes in empirical
work is hard because it essentially requires conditioning on all inputs. In general, what we
can do is to find an exogenous source of variation in a market or shadow price –excluded
by definition from the production function- which affects directly the input of interest and
indirectly other inputs of the production function. Thus, we estimate what is called in the
jargon a policy impact which contemplates the direct effect of the input of interest, say
class-size, and changes in other inputs -behavioral responses.
Most of the literature focuses on the effect of educational policies on student outcomes as
measured by contemporaneous and subsequent test-scores, school placement and high-school
graduation and health, employment and income in adult life. Very few studies, however,
measure thoroughly the behavioral responses from teachers and parents.24 Precisely, one
main contribution of this paper is to establish that the policy effect is the result of a complex
process of interaction among multiple actors. This suggests the need for empirical studies to
unpack the policy impact by disentangling the different channels uncovered by our model.
In our case, an increase in the opportunity cost of parents or a fall in the cost of manning
classes result in lower class-size. A fall in the cost of manning classes leads to an unambiguous
increase in effort and an improvement in student performance. Most credible studies of the
effect of class-size rely on reductions in the cost of manning classes either because of rules
governing maximum class-size (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Fredriksson, O¨ckert, and Oosterbeek,
2013, e.g.) which allocate resources to fund additional classes or because researchers facilitate
24This is somewhat surprising as there is a an extensive literature in public finance on the flypaper effect;
see Hines and Thaler (1995, e.g.) for a review and Das, Dercon, Habyarimana, Krishnan, Muralidharan, and
Sundararaman (2013) and Jacoby (2002) for examples related to schooling.
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the funds to operate smaller class-sizes (Krueger, 1999, e.g.).25 These studies find that lower
class-sizes lead to better student outcomes.
Surprisingly, however, there are few credible estimates of the behavioral responses of
teachers and parents to smaller class-sizes. An exception is the work of Fredriksson, O¨ckert,
and Oosterbeek (2013, Forthcoming) that measure the causal effect of class-size on individual
outcomes in childhood and adulthood in Sweden. They find that smaller class-sizes lead to
better outcomes in the short, medium and long run (Fredriksson, O¨ckert, and Oosterbeek,
2013). Consistent with the predictions of our model, Fredriksson, O¨ckert, and Oosterbeek
(Forthcoming) find that larger class-sizes cause parents to spend more time helping children
with homework but teachers tend to places a larger onus on their students under these
circumstances. This new evidence suggests that behavioral responses should be taken into
account in research design and ultimately in the evaluation of public policy.
Looking now at the impact of allocating children to better schools, in our model, an
improvement in the average ability of school peers leads to higher school effort. However,
parents of children in schools with better (worse) peers reduce (increase) their involvement.
Under the parametric assumptions of our model the parental reactions are not strong enough
to offset the higher school effort. Thus, our model will predict a positive effect for a child that
enters a higher quality school but this will be attenuated by parental behavioral responses.
There is a large number of studies about the effect of going to a better school. For
identification purposes all of these studies involve a layer of randomness in the allocation
of children to schools26 which is exploited for identification purposes. Some papers analyze
national or municipal policies where all the students in the system are allocated using a given
rule while others looked at participation in charter schools, targeted voucher programs or
admissions to highly selective institutions. Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2006) and Pop-Eleches
and Urquiola (2013) find that the parents of children that enter elite tracks or schools with
better peers spend less time helping their children with homework than the counterfactual.
This is consistent with our model.
On the final outcome there are indeed some studies which find positive effects of better
peers on student outcomes (Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013; Deming, Hastings, Kane, and
25Jackson et al (2016) present credible causal evidence of the effect of increasing school resources in general
by using school finance reforms in the US. They find that the reforms were associated with reductions in
student-to-teacher ratios, increases in teacher salaries and longer school years which eventually lead to sizable
improvements in years of completed education and adult wages.
26In some cases schools are oversubscribed so there is a lottery for the allocation of students to schools. In
others assignment to schools depends on an entry score and identification relies in comparing those students
marginally in and out of the school.
23
Staiger, 2014; Dobbie and Jr., 2011, e.g.). There are, however, others which find no effects
(Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, and Pathak, 2014; Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt, 2006; Clark, 2010,
e.g.).2728 Within the confines of our model this discrepancy may be due to parametric
differences, which lead to much stronger countervailing effects in the environments which
find no effects. Thus, our general message is that in order to interpret the reduced form
effect on outcomes of better schools one needs to consider the behavioral responses of the
different actors. This would help to understand the contexts in which the results found in a
particular paper carry to other contexts.
Finally, our model suggests a connection between parental opportunity cost of time,
school peers, teacher characteristics and the determination of school resources. A related
point appears in Besley and Case (2000), education policies are not exogenous to the political
process. The literature, however, is yet to provide credible empirical estimates on how these
parameters may affect the choices politicians make about the allocation of school resources.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study a model of education where student learning effort and outcomes,
parental and school behavior, and public resources devoted to education are endogenously
determined in an integrated and tractable framework. Our model, provides a rationale
for why the evaluation of educational interventions often provides mixed results. Beyond
rationalizing this phenomenon ex-post, the paper serves as a warning: many evaluation
exercises in education may be seriously compromised by issues of external validity due to a
lack of knowledge of behavioral aspects provoking and responding to changes in education
policy. Indeed, we show that the effects of changing educational inputs on educational
outcomes depend crucially on the sources of variation that cause this change. For this
reason, it may be hard to formulate education policy based on a menu of evaluation results.
The model also provides a microfoundation for peer effects. Groups of children with
higher average ability are more “profitable” to manage by teachers, who as a consequence
exert more effort in them. Then, any child will benefit from their presence in the school.
27It is worth pointing out, however, that in none of the studies we describe it is possible to isolate whether
the effect of going to a better school is driven by, for example, better peers, better teachers, better facilities,
etc. To the best of our knowledge, only Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer (2011) provide an environment in their
regression discontinuity design where everything else is kept constant. They find that there is no difference
between the lowest scoring students assigned to the high achievement class and the highest scoring students
assigned to the low-achievement class.
28Epple and Romano (2011) is an excellent survey of theoretical models, econometric estimation problems
and empirical results on peer effects in education.
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Peer effects, as in other models, may produce an incentive for sorting. It is not hard to show
that in some circumstances (e.g., when teaching technology favors low variance classrooms)
sorting could be Pareto improving. However, if the benefits from sorting are not evenly
distributed its welfare effects are potentially ambiguous since new classroom composition can
trigger lower motivation incentives from parents and at the school. We explore the effects
of sorting in Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2010), where governments can implement
policies leading to sorting according to talent, cultural preferences or religious beliefs. We
show that the resulting changes in classroom composition may lower parents’ and school
motivation efforts and reduce resources in disadvantaged classes. As a consequence, the
existing evaluations of these policies may need to be re-evaluated upon this light.
The richness of our environment can be used to look at other important questions. For
example, it could be used to explore the consequences of increasing school choice through
vouchers (see e.g. Epple and Romano (1998), Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009)) in a mixed
education system with private schools. The implementation of a voucher scheme subsidizing
private schools would involve changes in classroom composition which can trigger behavioral
response attenuating or reinforcing its effects. In particular, vouchers could induce peers
with higher talent to leave the public school.29 This could imply a decline in incentives
and resources received by the students who stay in the public school.30 This result would
follow mechanically from assuming the existence of peer effects as in most of the literature
(e.g., Benabou (1993)). In our model, where peer-effects are endogenously generated by the
interaction of parents and the school system, there would be an amplification effect via the
reaction of school resources and incentives to changes in the average ability of the peers. We
explore further the policy implications of our model in an ongoing project.
Furthermore, we have studied a static game. A dynamic version of the model is likely
to have consequences on two dimensions. First, a time varying comparative advantage of
parents and schools in motivating children may imply that the optimal path of parental,
school and government investment may differ over time. Second, a dynamic model will allow
for learning about the child’s type which might lead to important consideration about the
optimal timing of investment akin to those uncovered in the literature of R&D learning (see,
e.g. Grenadier and Weiss (1997)).
29This effect has been empirically uncovered by many studies. See for example, Howell and Peterson
(2002) for the case of the US, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), for Chile or Ladd (2002) for New Zealand.
30Altonji, Huang, and Taber (2004, 2010) provides evidence of this effect for the case of the U.S. MacLeod
and Urquiola (2015) study a model where individuals sort between schools for reputational reasons, because
employers observe average school performance. In that model, interestingly, the concern to have good peers
induces too much test preparation before admission, but too little study effort after admission.
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Finally, the political aspects of school choice are barely scratched in this paper. Since
the political authorities have a single instrument, school resources, and preferences over
this instrument are single-peaked, we can resort to the median voter theorem in discussing
the policymaker’s choice. If there were more instruments (say, because the level of funding
of charter schools is an electoral issue) more challenging (and more interesting) political
interactions involving education could be studied (as in, for example, Boldrin and Montes
(2005) or Levy (2005)).
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A Appendix A: Extensions and robustness checks
A crucial insight of our paper is that we should consider the behavioral responses of parents
when evaluating changes in educational policy. In this appendix, we discuss how some of the
modeling assumptions we made may affect the direction of these responses.
A.1 Monetary investments in learning
If school performance is determined alone by effort and talent, then it is natural to consider,
as we did so far, that parents induce more effort through time-consuming motivational and
monitoring activities. However, student outcomes may also be enhanced by other activities
with a direct effect on learning, such as paying for private tuition. Dealing with this concern
requires changes to the production function of human capital (Hi). Therefore, we study now
the case where learning outcomes are a function of monetary resources paid by parents.
To study how parental (monetary) education investments interplay with school (mone-
tary) resources, schools are also allowed to allocate monetary resources to enhance learning.
School (monetary) resources can be used, for example, to hire personal tutors or teaching
assistants. For simplicity, we assume that school monetary resources are chosen by the policy
maker. We also assume that monetary education resources are substitute to time effort in
order to focus on their direct effect. Also, this assumption greatly simplifies the analysis
since we can abstract from the determination of student effort.
In particular, let Hi, UPi and UPM be specified in the following way:
31
Hi = (gi + gPM)
1/2
UPi = 2 (gi + gPM)
1/2 − ηi
2
g2i
UPM = 2
n∑
i=1
(gi + gPM)
1/2 − ϕ
2
g2PM
31For simplicity in this discussion we subsume school decisions with those of the policymaker.
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Where gi and gPM represent monetary investment in learning by parents and the school,
respectively. The first order conditions of this problem are:
(gi + gPM)
−1/2 = ηigi
n∑
i=1
(gi + gPM)
−1/2 = ϕgPM
It readily follows that the policy maker increases gPM as a response of parents lowering
gi, and vice versa. If we take the analysis further, we obtain that in equilibrium:
g = (
1
η
)
2
3
(
1
nη
ϕ
+ 1
) 1
3
gPM =
n
nϕ
2
3 + ϕ
η
1
3
An important implication behind these expressions is that the impact evaluation of public
education expenditure requires taking into account parental investments, even if we consider
that parental monetary involvement as a substitute for learning effort; we obtain a similar
insight when we looked at the effect of motivation on student learning effort.
A.2 Direct peer effects
Peer effects in our model arise so far only because a class with better (worse) students induces
the teacher to provide higher (lower) effort. But in reality it is plausible that students benefit
(or harm) one another directly, and not only through their effect on the effort level of teachers,
or the investment of policymakers. We now also add this kind of direct peer effects, where
the human capital of a child is affected by the average effort in the school. Specifically, let
us assume that
Hi = υiei (1 + λe1j)
Following an analysis similar than at the core of the paper we obtain
c1i = max
{
ΥPiυi (1 + λe1j)−
c2j
2
, 0
}
c2j =
ΥTjυj
nj
(1 + λe1j)− c1j
2
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and hence
c1j = ΥPiυi (1 + λe1j)−
c2j
2
e1j =
1
3
2
−ΥPiυiλ−
ΥTjυj
nj
λ
(
ΥPiυi +
ΥTjυj
nj
)
e∗i = ΥPiυi +
ΥTjυj
nj
+
λΥPiυi + λ
ΥTjυj
nj
− 1
2
3
2
−ΥPiυiλ−
ΥTjυj
nj
λ
(
ΥPiυi +
ΥTjυj
nj
)
As can be readily seen by inspecting the previous expressions, the direct peer effects
make the impact of all the exogenous variables larger, but there are no additional qualitative
effects.
A.3 Parent and teacher complements
Let’s assume that parents’ and teachers’ efforts are complements so that
c = c1c2
Further, for tractability reasons, human capital is characterized now by Hi = υiei
α, with
α < 1.
The optimal student action is now,
e = c1c2. (23)
Substituting this expression into the parents’ utility we obtain
UP = (c1c2)
α υ +
(
Tψ − c1 (c1c2)
2ΥP
)
.
The first-order condition for the parents’s problem is then
αcα−11 c
α
2υ − c1c2
1
ΥP
= 0.
αcα2υ − c2−α1 c2
1
ΥP
= 0
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Given that this condition is sufficient, the optimal choice of the parent is
c1 =
(
αΥPυ
c1−α2
) 1
2−α
, (24)
which is always non-negative given that producing the rewards requires investing parental
time. By substituting the optimal choice of children’s effort into the utility function of the
headmaster we obtain:
UHM = (c1c2)
α υ +
(
Tγ − nc2 (c1c2)
2ΥT
)
It follows that an interior solution for the headmaster’s optimization problem implies
c2 =
(
αΥTυ
nc1−α1
) 1
2−α
, (25)
From (24) and (25) it is clear that the equilibrium values of c1 and c2 move in opposite
directions even though in this version of the model they are technological complements.
A.4 Endogenous quality of parental involvement
In the core of the paper, we associated productivity of parental motivation with something
innate (exogenous), like talent or capacity of persuasion. However, for a given unit of time
investment (and a given talent), parental motivation may also differ according to different
levels of attention or commitment to the task of motivating student effort. In our model,
this dimension can be captured by treating ΥPi as an endogenous variable. Consider that
the utility of parents is now defined by:
UPi = υiei +
(
Tψi − c1iei
2ΥPi
)
− 1
2
Υ2Pi , (26)
where ΥPi subsumes the quality of parental effort (attention) and involves quadratic costs.
For concreteness, we abstract from motivation provided by the school system.32 This implies
that effort is solely determined by c1i and thus
UPi = υic1i +
(
Tψi − c
2
1i
2ΥPi
)
− 1
2
Υ2Pi , (27)
32A similar analysis would carry over with similar insights if we dealt with endogenous quality of effort
for teachers.
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From the first order condition with c1i and ΥPiwe obtain:
υi − c1i
ΥPi
= 0
c21i
2Υ2Pi
−ΥPi = 0
Then
c1i = υiΥPi
(υiΥPi)
2
2Υ2Pi
−ΥPi = 0
ΥPi =
(υi)
2
2
c1i =
(υi)
3
2
The variation explored in this section delivers an interesting new insight: when the quality
of parental involvement is endogenous, the strength of rewards becomes more sensitive to
student talent.
A.5 Other population targets
Headmasters care about the learning outcomes of a whole distribution of students attending
their school. In our main analysis, we assumed that the relevant moment for the headmasters
was the mean of the outcome distribution. This is, of course, a crude description of the
reality and headmasters (as well as policy makers) target different measures of educational
achievement. A more general expression could be obtained by assuming that the headmaster
cares about a weighted average of the average student and the n-th order statistic of the
human capital distribution (Hi) at school j, denoted H
(n)
j . Then, let υ
(n)
j be the talent
corresponding to H
(n)
j and assume
UHMj = λ
1
Nj
∑
i∈j
Hi + (1− λ)H(n)j +
(
Tγ − nj
Nj
∑
i∈j
c2j (c1i + c2j)
2ΥTj
)
.
The parameter λ, with λ ∈ [0, 1], characterizes the weight given to each goal. Following
the analysis at the core of the paper we obtain that the equilibrium individual effort is given
by:
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ei = ΥPiυi+
1
3
ΥPiM υiM

(
2ΥTj
(
λυj+(1−λ)υ(n)j
)
ΥTjM
(
λυjM+(1−λ)υ
(n)
jM
) + θj
)(
2ΥTjM
(
λυjM+(1−λ)υ
(n)
jM
)
3
)2
1
ΥPiM
− θjω(
ω −
(
2ΥTjM
(
λυjM+(1−λ)υ
(n)
jM
)
3
)2
1
ΥPiM
)

This expression is similar to 22 since it relates individual student effort to the achieve-
ment of the targeted goal at the school level and at the school attended by the median child.
Importantly, this means that any measure of inequality that is captured by an order statis-
tic may be easily accommodated within our formulation, and the nature of the endogenous
peer-effects are qualitatively unchanged, although they would depend on different features
of the classroom composition. Notice, however, that other measures of human capital in-
equality based on different moments of the distribution would be more difficult to handle
analytically, although this result suggests that it is unlikely they would yield qualitatively
different implications.
A.6 Relative performance evaluation as the target
What would happen to school motivation effort if the headmaster has the goal of achieving
a certain average student outcome? Let HR be the human capital of average student in the
reference (R) school and assume that:
UHMj = κI 1
Nj
∑
i∈j(c1i+c2j)υi≥HR +
(
Tγ − nj
Nj
∑
i∈j
c2j (c1i + c2j)
2ΥTj
)
.
under these circumstances in equilibrium the effort of the c2j is
c2j =
HR − 1Nj
∑
i∈j c1iυi
υj
iff
κ ≥ nj
Nj
∑
i∈j
HR− 1Nj
∑
i∈j c1iυi
υj
(
c1i +
HR− 1Nj
∑
i∈j c1iυi
υj
)
2ΥTj
Since in equilibrium
c1iυi = ΥPiυ
2
i −
HR − 1Nj
∑
k∈j c1kυk
2υj
υi
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we have (after some algebra) that
1
Nj
∑
k∈j
c1kυk =
2
3Nj
∑
k∈j
ΥPkυ
2
k −
1
3
HR
so c2j is positive iff
κ ≥ nj
Nj
∑
i∈j
2
3
HR− 23Nj
∑
k∈j ΥPkυ
2
k
υj
(
c1i +
2
3
HR− 23Nj
∑
k∈j ΥPkυ
2
k
υj
)
2ΥTj
Notice that the effect of increasing the target is to increase effort for those schools which are
in a position to achieve it, but it decreases the effort to zero for those with low types.
B Appendix: Proofs
Proof of lemma 1
Proof Notice that the preferences of an arbitrary parent i with respect to a class size
level n (once he takes into account the taxes that the policymaker will have to levy to pay
for the costs of such class size) is:
UPi =
(
ΥPiυi +
1
3
(
2
n
ΥTjMυj − Ωj
))
υi +
+
(
Tψi − 1
2ΥPi
(
(ΥPiυi)
2 − 1
9
(
2
n
ΥTjυj − Ωj
)2))
− ω
2n2
,
so that
sign
(
∂UPi
∂n
)
= sign
(
−υi
3
(
2ΥTjυj
n2
)
− 2ΥTjυj
9ΥPin
2
(
2
n
ΥTjυj − Ωj
)
+
ω
n3
)
= sign
((
−2υiΥTjυj
3
+ Ωj
2ΥTjυj
9ΥPi
)
n− 4Υ
2
Tj
υ2j
9ΥPi
+ ω
)
and therefore the sign of the derivative of UPi with respect to n can change sign only once.
This means that there is at most one interior critical point. For this critical point to be a
maximum it is sufficient that
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−2υiΥTjυj
3
+ Ωj
2ΥTjυj
9ΥPi
< 0
Ωj =
1
Nj
∑
i∈j
ΥPiυi < 3ΥPiυi
And this is verified if
1
Nj
∑
i∈j
ΥPiυi < 3 min
i∈{1,...,N}
ΥPiυi.
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Online Appendix C: Algebra (not intended for publica-
tion)
n derivation
UPM =
2υ2
3
(
ΥP +
ΥT
n
)
+
(
Tψ − 2υ
2
9ΥP
(
2Υ2P +
ΥPΥT
n
− Υ
2
T
n2
))
− ω
2
1
n2
The first order condition with respect to n is:
∂UPM
∂n
= −2υ
2
3
(
ΥT
n2
)
− 2υ
2
9ΥP
(
−ΥPΥT
n2
+ 2
Υ2T
n3
)
+ ω
1
n3
n2
∂UPM
∂n
= −2υ
2
3
ΥT − 2υ
2
9ΥP
(
−ΥPΥT + 2Υ
2
T
n
)
+ ω
1
n
= −2υ
2
3
ΥT +
2υ2
9
ΥT − 4υ
2
9ΥP
Υ2T
n
+ ω
1
n
= −4υ
2
9
ΥT − 4υ
2
9ΥP
Υ2T
n
+ ω
1
n
Thus the only critical point is:
n =
ω − 4υ2
9ΥP
Υ2T
4υ2
9
ΥT
C Comparative statics (homogeneous case)
Comparative statics for c1, c2, and e with respect to υ
c1 =
2υΥP
3
(
2ω − 3 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
=
2ΥP
3
(
2ωυ − 3 (2ΥT
3
)2 υ3
ΥP
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
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∂c1
∂υ
=
2ΥP
3
[
2ω − 9 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
] [
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
+
[
2ωυ − 3 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
υ
] (
2ΥT
3
)2
2υ 1
ΥP[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
=
2ΥP
3
[
2ω − 9 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
] [
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
+
[
4ω − 6 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
] (
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
=
2ΥP
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
[(
4ω − 6 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
−
(
2ω − 9 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)]
+ ω
[
2ω − 9 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
=
2ΥP
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
[
2ω + 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
+ ω
[
2ω − 9 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
=
2ΥP
3
3
(
2υΥT
3
)4 1
Υ2P
+ ω
[
2ω − 7 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
and c2 > 0 implies that:
2ω < 6
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
and hence
2ω < 6
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
+
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
which leaves ∂c1
∂υ
> 0.
c2 =
2υΥP
3
(
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
− ω
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
=
2ΥP
3
(
3
(
2ΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
υ3 − ωυ
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
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∂c2
∂υ
=
2ΥP
3
[
9
(
2ΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
υ2 − ω
] [
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
+
[
3
(
2ΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
υ3 − ωυ
] (
2ΥT
3
)2
2υ 1
ΥP[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
=
2ΥP
3
[
9
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
− ω
] [
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
+
[
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
− ω
] (
2υΥT
3
)2
2 1
ΥP[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
but c1 > 0 implies
ω >
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
and c2 > 0 implies
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
> ω
and therefore that
9
(
2υΥT
3
)2
1
ΥP
> ω.
Then, ∂c2
∂υ
> 0.
e =
2υωΥP
3
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
∂e
∂υ
=
2ωΥP
3
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
+ 2
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
2ωΥP
3[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
=
2ωΥP
3
[
ω +
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2 > 0.
Comparative statics for c1, c2, and e with respect to $
c1 =
2υΥP
3
(
2ω − 3 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
40
∂c1
∂ω
=
2υΥP
3
2
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
−
[
2ω − 3 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
=
2υΥP
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2 > 0
c2 =
2υΥP
3
(
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
− ω
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
∂c2
∂ω
=
2υΥP
3
−
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
−
[
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
− ω
]
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
= −2υΥP
3
2
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2 < 0
e =
2υωΥP
3
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
∂e
∂ω
=
2υΥP
3
[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]
− 2υωΥP
3[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2
=
− (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP[
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
]2 < 0
Comparative statics for c1, c2, and e with respect to ΥP
c1 =
2υΥP
3
(
2ω − 3 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
=
2υ
3
(
2ωΥ2P − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
ωΥ2P −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)
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∂c1
∂ΥP
=
2υ
3
(
4ωΥP − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2)(
ωΥ2P −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)
−
(
2ωΥP −
(
2υΥT
3
)2)(
2ωΥ2P − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)
(
ωΥ2P −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)2
=
2υ
3
4ω2Υ3P − 289 ωΥ2Pυ2Υ2T + 1627ΥPυ4Υ4T −
(
4ω2Υ3P − 329 ωΥ2Pυ2Υ2T + 1627ΥPυ4Υ4T
)(
ωΥ2P −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)2
=
2υ
3
4
9
ωΥ2Pυ
2Υ2T(
ωΥ2P −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)2 = 2υ3 49ωυ2Υ2T(
ωΥP −
(
2υΥT
3
)2)2 > 0
c2 =
2υΥP
3
(
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
− ω
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
=
2υ
3
(
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 − ωΥP
ωΥP −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
)
Notice the numerator is decreasing in ΥP and the denominator increasing in ΥP , thus
∂c2
∂ΥP
< 0
e =
2υωΥP
3
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
=
2υωΥ2P
3ωΥP − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2
∂e
∂ΥP
=
4υωΥP
(
3ωΥP − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2)− 6υω2Υ2P(
3ωΥP − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2)2 = 23υωΥP (9ωΥP − 8υ2Υ2T )(
3ωΥP − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2)2 S 0
The effect is negative if ω <
8υ2Υ2T
9ΥP
.
Comparative statics for c1, c2, and e with respect to ΥT
c1 =
2υΥP
3
(
2ω − 3 (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
=
2υ
3
(
2ωΥ2P − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
ωΥ2P −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)
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∂c1
∂ΥT
=
2υ
3
−8υ2ΥT
3
ΥP
(
ωΥ2P −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)
+ 8υ
2ΥT
9
ΥP
(
2ωΥ2P − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)
(
ωΥ2P −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)2
=
2υ
3
−8
9
ωυ2Υ3PΥT(
ωΥ2P −
(
2ΥT
3
)2
ΥP
)2 < 0
c2 =
2υΥP
3
(
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
− ω
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
)
=
2υ
3
(
3
(
2υΥT
3
)2 − ωΥP
ωΥP −
(
2υΥT
3
)2
)
Notice the numerator is increasing in ΥT and the denominator decreasing in ΥT , thus
∂c2
∂ΥT
> 0
e =
2υωΥP
3
ω − (2υΥT
3
)2 1
ΥP
=
2υωΥ2P
3ωΥP − 3
(
2υΥT
3
)2
Notice the the denominator decreasing in ΥT , thus
∂e
∂ΥT
< 0
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